

19 January 1983

NIC Meeting

-- Very important meeting - discuss some changes - comments on our performance - review last year's schedule - discuss 1983 program

-- Fred Hutchinson is being reassigned - Herb Meyer has been appointed Vice Chairman of the NIC - my prime purpose in this is to get more editorial abioity into the process to curb a recent tendency toward extended and turgid estimates. I have been impressed with Herb's eye for policy relevance and believe that he will help to see that terms of reference are worked over until it is clear what the estimate is expected to do, why it is needed and that it will address live policy needs in a useful way - see that Senior Review Panel and Community input is obtained at that stage - too many terms of reference have been mere laundry lists.

-- Last year was a very productive one - great number of estimates - some very sharp, to the point timely and relevant.

-- But we fell off toward end of year - too many were delayed to the point of being less useful, too long, not sufficiently sharp, concise, relevant.

-- Too many estimates have turned out to be long research papers and essays. There are some estimates which we will want to use to make available hard to get data - strategic forces, Warsaw Pact data, as well as judgments, but for the most part I want short, pointed, crisp, sharp judgments designed to warn and point up issues and to assist in addressing them. I want to know early on if an estimate is not moving in that direction. It is unacceptable to have estimates wander around for months only to find a great amount of work is put into something which

isn't going to be useful or has in some other way drifted down a blind alley. Sometimes the problem may be that the subject doesn't really lend itself to a useful estimate in which case the assignment should never have been made - we want to discover that early and change signals.

-- I understand that some of the delays have come from difficulty in getting assigned drafters and people with relevant knowledge to put enough time into an estimative product. If we get them better designed at the outset and shape them up as briefer, more concise undertakings, that alone will tend to mitigate this problem. There will still be the 50-page estimates here and there but we will have to see that the <sup>necessary</sup> people are dedicated, ~~to get~~ <sup>are</sup> most of them ~~to 15~~ <sup>to 8</sup> to 15 page estimates, ~~we~~ <sup>we</sup> will get more interest in doing them and they will be less of a burden and a better product will result from making them briefer and sharper.

-- Now I would like to review where we stand on estimates which were scheduled for last year and carried over, <sup>I'd like</sup> ~~and~~ get a reading on the problems that were encountered in doing them and where we are going on them now. It looks to me as though most of the estimates on the first three pages are carryovers.

-- Now I would like to talk about the 1983 production schedule. I would be interested in knowing how that was put together, where did the subjects come from, in a general sort of way? ~~Two of those do not~~ have drafters assigned. *I note some of them due early don't have drafters assigned*

-- Now I'd like to have a little discussion on what we see as <sup>the major</sup> policy and problems to be confronted in 1983. That should certainly be <sup>essential</sup> ~~one of the~~ background judgments <sup>in the</sup> formulated <sup>in</sup> an estimate program, recognizing

that adaption will have to be made as new circumstances develop.

-- There is virtually nothing in the program on international financial and economic problems. We certainly need to look at financial implications of protectionist and austerity negotiations - we would particularly want to look at where the debt burden, the IMF austerity requirements, low commodity prices are likely to boil over into political pressures. I think we should look at both where in the Third World these potentials seem to be most explosive and at the attitude of major advanced industrial nations to slipping up and assuming responsibilities to reduce the risk that would otherwise have to be faced.

-- We certainly have to assess the German posture in the aftermath of the election and the French posture in the aftermath of municipal elections and any steps which Mitterrand takes to disassociate from the Communists. There are assessments scheduled on forces in West European countries but nothing on how they plan to use those forces, the direction of defense thinking in the European countries, how they perceive military aspects of the alliance, etc.

-- The estimate on political instability is an annual one and I don't see it there. Particularly we will need to look at Saudi Arabia and the situation in Iran and Iraq and the entire Persian Gulf sometime during the year. The Soviet program is focussed on military affairs. We will want to look at the economy and the outlook for defense spending sometime during the year.

-- It is time for a look at the relationship of the Soviet Union and Cuba in terms of the level of Soviet economic and military support, integration and military planning, common political purposes and initiatives.

-- The African section seems kind of skimpy, particularly in the light of indication of renewed Libyan activity in Central Africa and probable activity involving Namibia, Angola, South African pressure on Mozambique and Zimbabwe, Zaire that is very fragile, and possible Cuban and Soviet reactions.

-- I think the estimates should be concentrated as much as possible on regional and transregional perspectives and the impact of broad forces and trends at work in specific countries and regions.

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-- Somewhere we should take a broader look at the narcotics problem and the specific one scheduled under Colombia Drug Trade.

-- The DDI research program has been one which took in a context that the strategic problems facing us is our hope that the NIC production would be developed, both in the context of the strategic problems we are facing with a view to drawing on the DDI research which most of our analytical resource will be invested to shape that work into estimative products.

-- I would like to get some comment around the room on how we are doing and how we can improve contribution of policymakers and Intelligence Community components in formulation of the estimates' production schedule.

-- I have attended two meetings which NIOs have had with their counterparts with the Community and was impressed in both cases by the way views were changed on matters of high policy concerns, counterintelligence assessments which were contributed yearly with those issues and what needs to be done to improve collection in order to address those issues more actively. I would like to hear how a view of the other NIOs function in this regard.